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LITTLE VALUE TO STATE AND
LOCAL PROSECUTORS
While it is overwhelmingly accepted that prosecutors need substan-
tial discretion in order to properly carry out their jobs,' there is great
potential for abuse in their inevitable2 use of this decision-making
1 One definition of discretion is "the power to make decisions or to act according to one's
own judgment." Cox, Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview, 13 Am. GRIM. L. REv. 383, 385
(1976). Langbein defined prosecutorial discretion as "the power to decline to prosecute in
cases of provable criminal liability." Langbein, Controlling ProsecutorialDiscretion in Germany, 41
U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 440 (1974).
According to Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), "the United States
Attorney is not a rubber stamp. His problems are not solved by the strict application of an
inflexible formula." In Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court
recognized and commended prosecutorial discretion, noting that while two persons may have
committed what is exactly the same legal offense, the prosecutor is not required by law, duty,
or tradition to treat them the same as to charges. Id at 481-82. Several other justifications
for discretion include the difficulty in drafting rules to incorporate all relevant specificities,
the inability to adapt statutory law rapidly enough to match shifts in public opinion, and the
need to test public reaction to changes which may lead to legislative reform in a particular
area. Abrams, IntenalPoli-: Guiding the Exercise ofProsecutorialDiscretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1, 3 (1971). See also United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114 (1979); Moses v. Kennedy, 219
F. Supp. 762 (D.D.C. 1963); K. DAVIS, DISCRErIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
(1969); B. GROSSMAN, THE PROSECUTOR: AN INQUIRY INTO THE EXERCISE OF DISCRE-
TION (1969); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF Jus-
TICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 133-34 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N]; Cole, The Decision to Prosecute, 4 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 331 (1970).
Abolition of prosecutorial discretion would arguably result in.never-ending review of
decisions, overly rigid treatment of defendants and inability to put limited funds to use.
Comment, Duplicative Statutes, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Illinois Armed Violence Statute, 71 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 226 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Duplicative Statutes].
2 No society will tolerate a rule of compulsory prosecution requiring the prosecutor to
institute criminal proceedings in eveiy case, despite the inevitability of error in a discretionary
system. Langbein, subra note 1, at 440. See also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 133-
34; H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw (1961); Abrams, supra note 1, at 5; Breitel, Controls in
Ciminal Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 427 (1960); Bubany & Skillern, Taming the
Dragow An Administrative Lawfor Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 473, 477
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power.3 Nobody disputes the desirability of consistent and evenhanded
treatment of individuals within our criminal justice system,4 yet com-
mentators continue to regard as a serious problem unchecked prosecu-
tors' disparate application of the criminal law.5 Consequently, these
commentators have called for issuance of detailed written prosecutorial
(1976); Hermann, The Rule of Compulsoqy Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutor'al Discretion in
Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 468 (1974).
Although there are ways that the law can limit the inevitability of discretion, one com-
mentator attributes the extension of discretion by statute and criminal codes to legislative
inertia and public indifference. Cox, supra note 1, at 387.
3 Earl J. Silbert, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, warns that the
"prosecutor's assuming more extensive responsibilities and exerting increased influence and
power in order to control crime increases his potential and capacity for abuse." Silbert, The
Role of the Prosecutor in the Process of Cn'minalJnstice, 63 A.B.A.J. 1717, 1720 (1977). Silbert notes
that "[t]o help control crime, prosecutors must necessarily have broad discretion," but then
cautions that "[i]mproperly or unfairly exercised . . . this discretion can cause injustice and
undermine public confidence in the administration of criminal justice." Id
The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice expresses concern over
the fact that "[m]atters of grave public concern, as well as matters of concern to the defend-
ants most affected by the decisions, are the result of 'informal' policies and practices." NAT'L
INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE NEW JUSTICE: ALTERNATIVES
TO CONVENTIONAL CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION 37 (1975) [hereinafter THE NEW JUSTICE].
The President's Commission found that more often than not, prosecutors exercise their
discretion under circumstances and in ways that make unwise decisions highly probable.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 130. See also H. PACKER, THE LIMrrs OF THE CRIMI-
NAL SANCTION (1968); Abrams, supra note 1, at 3; Rosett, Discretion, Severity and Legality in
Crzminaljustice, 46 S. CAL. L. REv. 12 (1972). Justice Jackson, then Attorney General, noted
that, given his broad discretion,
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other person
in America. . . . While the prosecutor at his best is one of the most beneficient forces in
our society, when he acts from malice or other base motives, he is one of the worst.
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3 (1940). The
courts also have recognized the potential for abuse of discretion and recent decisions "indicate
an increased willingness on the part of judges to impose limits upon the prosecutor in his
exercise of discretion." Cox, supra note 1, at 385. See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d
479, 482.
4 Abrams, supra note 1, at 4.
5 For example, Arthur Rosett states: "Modem criminal justice is a highly selective pro-
cess in which severe punishment is meted out to a few, while many other individuals who
appear similarly situated escape with little or no punishment." Rosett, supra note 3, at 14.
"Much of the dissatisfaction with the operation of the criminal process relates to the disparity
in treatment of the individual that results in his being treated one way or another because of
slight and sometimes random variations in circumstance." Id at 16. See also K. DAVIS, supra
note 1, at 224; Breitel, supra note 2, at 429; Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A
Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246 (1980); Gross & Maloney,
Standards for US. Prosecutors May Fall Short of Their Targets, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 18, 1980, at 27;
Holderman, Preindictment Prosecutorial Condtct in the FederalSystem, 71 J. CRIM. L. & C. 1 (1980);
LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532 (1970). But see
Mellon, Jacoby & Brewer, The Prosecutor Constrained by His Environment. A New Look at Discretion-
aryJzstice in the United States, 72 J. CRIM. L. & C. 52 (1981) in which the authors of a compre-
hensive study of prosecutorial charging policy and practices in ten jurisdictions concluded
that "prosecutors throughout the United States appear to operate consistently and with uni-
formity in distributing justice." Id at 81.
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standards, 6 particularly since the quality of a prosecutor's performance
often improves when those with whom he deals are more aware of his
policies and procedures. 7 Few guidelines are available to prosecutors at
the state and local level,8 however, and until recently, no formal set of
principles existed to guide federal prosecutors on when and how to bring
criminal charges. 9 Writers thus labelled the existing state of
6 See, e.g., The National Institute on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice's proposal
that the rule-making provisions of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act serve as a poten-
tial model. THE NEW JUSTICE, supra note 3. See also K. DAVIS, sura note 1, at 225-26 (Davis
calls for written policies, public and open to comment and subject to regular consideration
and change); Abrams, supra note 1, at 57; Bubany & Skillern, sura note 2, at 495-99; Cox,
supra note 1, at 433; Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminalfustice Of ials, 1976 DUKE
LJ. 651, 681-83 (1976).
Prior to the Justice Department's release of the Principles of Federal Prosecution in 1980, the
American Bar Association, the National District Attorneys Association, and the Illinois Bar
Association all issued proposals to control prosecutorial discretion. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]; ILLINOIS
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1978) [hereinafter cited as ISBA STANDARDS];
NAT'L DISTRICT ATTORNEYS AS'N NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS]. The National District Attorneys Associa-
tion, although sensitive to the arguments that the broad discretion of the prosecutor allows for
the abuse or unequal treatment of individuals before the law, noted that the preparation of
written guidelines regularizes and structures discretion, limiting the possibility that it will be
exercised in an arbitrary and discriminatory fashion. NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS,
supra at 89.
7 Cox, supra note 1, at 433. Guidelines tend to minimize the influence of non-objective
factors, such as the attitudes of the arresting officer or complaining party, and facilitate in-
forming the public. Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 497-98.
8 The President's Commission described prosecutors' discretionary decisions as "often
, unguided by explicit statutes, judicial rules, or administrative policies, and are not sub-
jected to public, or in most cases judicial, scrutiny." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at
130. As a rule, the courts have declined to formulate definite standards for the exercise of the
charging discretion. Kavanaugh, Representing the People of Illinois: Prosecutorial Power and its
Limitations, 27 DE PAUL L. REv. 625, 632 (1978). According to Professor Vorenberg, a few
local prosecutors with large staffs have issued guidelines on charging policy and practices,
including plea bargaining. Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 680 (citing, e.g., DISTRICT ATTORNEY
OF HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS, THE PROSECUTOR'S DISCRETION: A STATEMENT OF POLICY
(1974); DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF KING COUNTY, WASHINGTON, GUIDELINES (1976)). How-
ever, he notes that the guidelines are drafted so broadly as to retain a great deal of flexibility.
Id See also Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion--A Re-Evaluation of the Prosecutor s UnbridledDiscre-
tion and its Potentialfor Abuse, 21 DE PAUL L. REv. 485, 492 (1971).'
9 Although Justice Department officials established national investigative and
prosecutorial priorities from time to time in the interest of allocating their limited resources to
achieve an effective nationwide law enforcement program, they have allowed individual
United States attorneys to establish their own priorities within the national priorities. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION 8 (1980). See also Kaplan, Prosecutorial
Discretion-4 Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 174, 177 (1965). This individualized approach may
effectively eliminate the prosecution of a particular class of crimes that the Justice Depart-
ment deems critical, if a United States Attorney determines that it would not be beneficial to
prosecute such crimes in utilizing limited resources on a local or regional level.
In describing his experiences at the United States Attorney's office for the Northern Dis-




The Justice Department, on July 28, 1980, in an effort to correct
this deficiency at the federal level issued a comprehensive listing of poli-
cies and practices to be followed by all prosecutors within the Justice
Department and United States Attorneys' offices.'1 The new guidelines
closely resemble proposals put forth by various professional organiza-
tions12 with only a few notable deviations. This Comment's thesis is
that the Justice Department's published rules, while a slight improve-
ment over the previously inconsistent procedural and substantive deci-
sion-making process employed by federal prosecutors, are too general
and permissive to achieve the desired level of consistency and even-
handedness in applying the criminal law to citizens at the state and lo-
cal level.13 Thus, they and the proposals upon which the guidelines are
modeled should not serve as prototypes for much needed local
prosecutorial guidelines.
United States Attorneys,' 4 whose discretion is extraordinarily
effective use of their limited time and energies, the assistants over the years had evolved a
largely tacit but nonetheless real set of standards for making the prosecutorial decision. Id at
178.
10 Abrams, supra note 1, at 58. While several of the articles relied upon in this Comment
deal primarily with state and local prosecutors and others focus solely on federal prosecutors,
as a rule general criticisms are equally applicable to both levels of prosecution. For example,
studies of charging procedures in United States Attorneys' offices and local prosecuting offices
yield remarkably uniform results. Thomas & Fitch, Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 507, 511 (1976). But see Kavanaugh, supra note 8, at 631, who argues that
major differences exist between the federal and state prosecutorial systems.
11 The document, entitled the Principles of Federal prosecution, is the product of more than
three years of work under Attorneys General Edward Levi, Griffin Bell, and Benjamin Civi-
letti. According to Civiletti, the publication represents the first time in the history of the
Justice Department that "sound prosecutorial policies and practices" have been put together
in one place. See J. HERALD, July 28, 1980, at 16, col. 1. The guidelines apply to all federal
prosecutors including those employed in the Criminal Division in the Department of Justice
in Washington.
12 See note 6 supra.
13 The preface to the Pinciples of Federal Prosecution cautions that the guidelines have delib-
erately been cast in general terms with a view toward providing guidance rather than man-
dating results. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at i. This Comment argues that the
generality has defeated the purposes of establishing such guidelines. Furthermore, the De-
partment of Justice specifies that reference to the guidelines is not intended to require a par-
ticular prosecutorial decision in any given case. Id at Part A(2), comment. Furthermore, the
criticism that the practical value of such guidelines as the American Bar Association Stan-
dards, the National Prosecution Standards and the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity is strictly limited as these standards do little more than condemn prosecutorial discretion
not motivated toward the public purpose of the office is equally applicable to the Prt'nciples of
Federal Prosecution. See Kavanaugh, supra note 8, at 632.
14 United States Attorneys, whom the President appoints for four-year terms, are responsi-
ble for prosecution of federal criminal cases in each of the ninety-four judicial districts. 28
U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(b) (1976). In large offices, most of the prosecutorial decisions may be dele-
gated to Assistant United States Attorneys. Kaplan, supra note 9, at 176. Throughout this'
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broad,' 5 particularly in instituting criminal prosecution, have access to
several sources of suggested standards of conduct in addition to the re-
cently issued Principles of Federal Prosecution. 16 One example is the Justice
Department's nine-part United States Attorneys' Manual providing "in-
ternal guidance [for] the U.S. Attorneys' Offices .... 17 Additionally,
the Code of Federal Regulations contains published standards of con-
duct for Department of Justice attorneys.18 Prosecutors also learn of
national law enforcement priorities guiding prosecutorial decisions from
Department of Justice memoranda, bulletins and letters, United States
Attorney's conferences, meetings with individual prosecutors and their
staffs, and meetings with the United States Attorney's Advisory Com-
mittee.19 United States Attorneys also benefit from the Department of
Justice's "Memoranda of Understanding" with other federal agencies
and departments regarding what offenses should be submitted to United
States Attorneys for investigation or prosecution and which should be
handled internally by the agencies or departments. 20 Used in conjunc-
tion with all these resources, the consolidation of general procedures in
the Principles of Federal Prosecution may facilitate consistent treatment of
individuals within the federal criminal justice system.2' Unfortunately,
Comment, the term United States Attorney will apply to all prosecutors within a United
States Attorney's office unless otherwise stated.
15 Professor Abrams notes that United States Attorneys have "relative autonomy in prose-
cution from the filing of the complaint up to and including the handling of the appeal
through the United States Court of Appeals." Abrams, supra note 1, at 55 n. 189. The preface
to the Principles of Federal Prosecution, states that "[t]he manner in which federal prosecutors
exercise their decision-making authority has far-reaching implications, both in terms ofjustice
and effectiveness in law enforcement and in terms of the consequences for individual citi-
zens." DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9.
16 But see text accompanying notes 49-50 infra.
17 28 C.F.R. § 0.16(b) (1980). DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL
(Aug. 31, 1976) (unpublished manual available from the Dep't of Justice). The nine-part
Manual, prepared by the Executive Office of United States Attorneys, is available for
purchase from the Executive Office of United States Attorneys, United States Department of
Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530, under the disclosure requirements of the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act at a per page fee. Id § 1-1.400.
18 Holderman, supra note 5, at 3-4.
19 DEPIT OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S WRITTEN GUIDELINES FOR THE DECLINATION
OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 29-30 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
DECLINATION GUIDELINES].
20 Id at 30.
21 It is certainly arguable that the Pr'tciples of Federal Prosecution do not strike the proper
balance, however. See note 9 sura. Certainly, with the limited access the general public has
to the supplemental resources supposedly available to United States attorneys, it is difficult to
ascertain whether the apparent deficiencies of the new guidelines are rectified by other mater-
ials.
Use of prosecutorial discretion can result in inequitable application of the law in two
ways at the federal level: statutes may be enforced with varying degrees of strictness from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, or they may be enforced in a discriminatory fashion against vari-
ous offenders within a particular jurisdiction. As an example of the former, a person is likely
1981]
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comparable resources seldom exist for state and local prosecutors;22
therefore, general guidelines modeled after the Pn~czles of Federal Prose-
cution would do little to solve prosecutorial abuse and misuse of discre-
tion at this level.
Controlling prosecutorial discretion is feasible and can be compati-
ble with a democratic system of justice. In Germany, for example, as in
the United States, prosecutors necessarily have some discretion to select
which crimes will be prosecuted. However, the German system of com-
pulsory prosecution, with its limited provision for "restrained discre-
tion," 23 articulates much more clearly and explicitly the criteria of
selection.2 4 Despite its discretionary non-prosecution exception to the
general rule of compulsory prosecution, with provisions similar to those
outlined in the Prznciples of Federal Prosecution, the German system limits
the discretion not to prosecute to misdemeanors.2 5 This important limi-
tation is not imposed upon, or in all cases desired for,26 American prose-
cutors. However, without this limitation, American prosecutors have a
much greater impact on the fate of an individual defendant since the
magnitude of the crime and the severity of the sentence may be substan-
tially greater than in a German misdemeanor case. An even more im-
portant distinction, however, is that German citizens, unlike United
States citizens, have the right to departmental and judicial review of
decisions not to prosecute.2 7 The discretion of German prosecutors is
not only subject to severe regulation, but citizens have recourse in the
event of arbitrary decisions.
Controlling prosecutorial discretion in the United States involves a
difficult balancing process. As the American Bar Association stated in
its Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, "[t]here is need for caution
to be prosecuted and jailed in the Northern District of Florida for selling five LSD tablets,
while that same person might not be prosecuted in the Southern District of New York for the
more serious crime of selling three ounces of cocaine. Gross & Maloney, supra note 5, at 27.
Similarly, in money crimes such as theft and fraud, the amount of money triggering federal
prosecution in one district may be 100 times greater than the threshold in another district.
Lewin,Justice: Guides Stay Sealed, NAT'L L.J., June 16, 1980, at 6. This problem is not ad-
dressed in the guidelines. See text accompanying notes 66-68 infra. The latter form of inequi-
table application of the law is more clearly addressed by the guidelines although here, too, it
is arguable that the new guidelines are inadequately detailed to solve the problem. See text
accompanying notes 95-109, 138-40, 181, 188-92, 202-03.
22 See generaly Kavanaugh, supra note 8.
23 Herrmann, supra note 2, at 504-05.
24 See Langbein, upra note 1, at 467.
25 In practice, the discretion is generally limited to trivial misdemeanors only. Id at 460,
citing Herrmann, supra note 2, at 481-89.
26 The rule of compulsory prosecution may lead to absurd results in some cases.
Langbein, supra note 1, at 474-75.




in formulating standards broad enough to encompass the wide variety of
factual situations to which they must be applied and narrow enough to be
an explicit and specf guide on the subject .... -"2 The goal, according to
Professor Kenneth C. Davis, is not to confine, structure, and check
prosecutorial discretion to the maximum degree, but rather to find the
"optimum degree" in each set of circumstances. 29 There is a fine line
between providing answers and giving direction.30 While strict rules
designed to meet every conceivable situation would be impossible, de-
tailed outlines, explicit hypotheticals, and mechanisms for accountabil-
ity are feasible and needed. Without support materials and detailed
supplements such as those provided federal prosecutors, the guidelines
promulgated by the Justice Department are overbroad and provide lit-
tle concrete guidance.
Public awareness that enforcement of criminal laws in many cases
may depend on the sole judgment of the prosecutor has increased dra-
matically in recent years.3 ' Concurrently, the United States Supreme
Court has evinced a growing concern over the vast degree of discretion
in the criminal justice system and has tended to require more specific
standards for critical decision-making in criminal cases.32 Presently,
28 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 60 (emphasis added). The ABA does qualify its
standards by recognizing that "ambiguity is intrinsic in many of the problems with which
they deal and which the advocate's conscience must guide." Id
29 K. DAvIs, supra note 1, at 4. The mere fact that discretion exists does not mean it
should be abolished. See note 1 supra. Reasons cited to justify the need for discretionary
decisions include the enormous number of cases that come into the criminal process, the lim-
ited amount of funding available to prosecutorial staffs, the necessity of individualizing appli-
cation of the law to individual offenders, the limits in lawmakers' abilities to adequately
enunciate exactly what conduct they wish to prohibit, the overcriminalization of conduct, the
inherent limits of statutory language, the need to allow law enforcement to be directed and
adapted to the needs of a locality, and the impossibility of reviewing every decision of every
prosecutor in the United States. For elaboration on these various arguments, see generalv
Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 492; Cox, supra note 1, at 386; LaFave, supra note 5, at
533; Langbein, supra note 1, at 451; Kaplan, supra note 9, at 188; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra
note 1, at 133-34; Rosett, supra note 3, at 20; and Comment, Duplicative Statutes, supra note 1.
30 See, e.g., Kavanaugh, supra note 8, at 649-50. Rules can take different forms, varying in
their utility and effectiveness. According to the authors of a recent quantitative study of
prosecutorial discretion, the continuum runs from mandatory rules, e.g., "all conspiracies to
distribute heroin will be prosecuted if the evidence suggests a reasonable likelihood of convic-
tion," to guidelines or factors, e.g. "a prior record for the same offense is a factor in favor of
prosecution." Frase, supra note 5, at 298. In the middle of the continuum is the presumptive
rule, e.g. "cases involving one ounce of heroin or less will normally not be prosecuted, absent
unusual circumstances." Id, citing Abrams, supra note 1, at 22-24. This Comment uses the
term "guidelines" loosely to encompass rules and factors at different points along the contin-
uum, depending upon the procedure at issue.
31 Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 473-74. Bubany and Skillern cite the "controversial
and highly visible 'deal' between the Department of Justice and the former Vice-President,
Spiro T. Agnew" as perhaps the most significant event leading to increased public awareness.
Id at 473 n.2.
32 Id at 474 (citinge.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974), a case involving flag abuse
1981]
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there is no absolute protection from abuse of discretion 33 despite the
numerous formal and informal controls which theoretically exist. 34
With the great potential for abuse of prosecutorial discretion,35 the
range of relevant considerations along with the thinking of prosecuting
attorneys within a particular system must be narrowed through explic-
itly formulated policy.36 The President's Commission on Law Enforce-
ment and Administration of Justice found that despite the presence of
factors which tend to increase conformity in the decision-making pro-
cess, 37 the lack of clearly stated standards to guide office personnel, par-
in which the court concluded that "perhaps the most meaningful aspect of the vagueness
doctrine is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine-the require-
ment that a legislature establish minimum guidelines to govern law enforcement." Id at
574). But see United States v. Bachelder, 442 U.S. 114.
33 See, e.g., Cox, supra note 1, at 433. There are, however, factors which define and limit a
prosecutor's legally absolute discretion, such as judicial review and the possibility of removal
of prosecutors in cases of abuse of discretion. Proving discriminatory prosecution is very diffi-
cult, though. See note 137 infra for the two elements of proof necessary to convict a prosecu-
tor of discriminatory prosecution. Some of the difficulties in proving disparate treatment
were alleviated by United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973), which held that if the
defendant presented enough factual evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about prosecutorial
motives, the burden shifted to the prosecutor to show otherwise. Id at 620-21. This circuit
court case represents the "leading case" on discriminatory prosecution. Amsterdam, The One-
Sided Sword. Selective Prosecution in Federal Courts, 6 RuT.-CAm. L.J. 1, 10 (1974). However,
absent a suspect criterion such as race or religion, it is unlikely that the defendant will be able
to prove arbitrary action. Givelber, The Application of Equal Protection Prin'ciples to Selective En-
forcement of the Criminal Law, 1973 ILL. L.F. 88, 115. See generaly Note, Reviewability of
Prosecutorial Discretion " Failure to Prosecute, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 130 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Failure to Prosecute], for an analysis of the applicability ofjudicial review of prosecutorial deci-
sions.
Monitoring selective and discriminatory use of discretion becomes particularly compel-
ling since removal is the only available remedy for a United States attorney's abuse of power.
Seymour, Let's Take Politics Out of Federal Law Enforcement, 61 JUD. 119, 122 (1977). "The
Attorney General can overrule a U.S. Attorney and direct the institution or discontinuance of
a criminal proceeding, but he risks alienating public opinion." Id Public recourse through
the electoral process has been more illusory than effective as a remedy. Bubany & Skillern,
supra note 2, at 492 (citing Note, Discretion and the Constitutionality of the New Death Penalty
Statutes, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1690 (1974)).
34 Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 483. They characterize the controls as "largely
ineffective and reflective of a traditional judicial deference to prosecutorial judgment." Id
See also ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 81.
35 See note 3 supra.
36 Abrams, supra note 1, at 57. Abrams cautions that while guidelines will not insure
complete uniformity of decision, they should "move the prosecutorial system further along
the road to 'tolerable consistency.' " Id
Disparity in use of discretion results from a variety of internal and external pressures.
Discretionary justice is often complicated--or simplified-by "pressures, personalities and
politics." K. DAvis, supra note 1, at 24. Specifically, judicial involvement, the news media,
various individuals, interest groups and public opinion may affect prosecutorial discretion.
See generally Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2. The discretionary decision alone may involve
questions of "justice, law, facts, policy, politics, and ethics." K. DAvis, supra note 1, at 24.
37 The following factors induce conformity to general standards among prosecutors:
caseload restraints, the desire to win, law enforcement considerations, the pressure of public
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ticularly in large offices at the state and local levels, resulted in little
likelihood of consistent charging and dismissing of cases.3 8 The Com-
mission found that many discretionary decisions were made "hastily and
haphazardly," 39 with insufficient information about the offense, the of-
fender, his needs or the community and correctional treatment pro-
grams.4° Expediency now appears to be the primary objective of tbe
criminal justice system.4 1
The dual objectives of the Justice Department's Principles of Federal
Prosecution apply equally to all prosecutorial offices: ensuring fair and
effective responsibility by government attorneys "and promoting confi-
dence on the part of the public and individual defendants that impor-
tant prosecutorial decisions will be made rationally and objectively on
the merits of each case." 42 The federal guidelines specifically aim at
curbing abuses and inconsistencies in prosecutorial discretion in six ar-
eas: (1) initiating and declining prosecution; (2) selecting charges; (3)
entering into plea agreements; (4) opposing offers to plead nolo contendere;
(5) entering into non-prosecution agreements in return for cooperation;
and (6) participating in sentencing.43 While the guidelines may meet
their twofold purpose at the federal level in each of these six areas, their
practical utility at the state and local level is highly questionable.
PARAMETERS OF PUBLISHED PROSECUTORIAL GUIDELINES
Inherent in prosecutorial decision-making is an underlying tension
between the related needs for consistency and certainty, and the con-
trary needs for flexibility and sensitivity.44 In the United States, the
specific facts and circumstances of each particular case determine the
ultimate decision whether to prosecute. While written guidelines should
not completely restrain the prosecutor from basing priorities and poli-
opinion, and the constraints inherent in professional ethics. Cox, supra note 1, at 411, 413-17.
See also LaFave, supra note 5, at 533.
Within an office, certain factors also encourage conformity. For example, assistant prose-
cutors often share a common perception of their role as each has learned the standards for
prosecution by the tenured assistants. Kaplan, supra note 9, at 177. Another powerful factor
inducing conformity to general standards is the possibility that the prosecutor who authorized
prosecution might not be the attorney who tries the case; thus, another might carefully ex-
amine his decision to prosecute. Id
38 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 133.
39 Id. at 130.
40 Id The Commission stated that since prosecutors rarely arrive at decisions on the basis
of carefully worked out policies or by the use of systematic procedures and policy-makers
rarely review these decisions more than perfunctorily, one can safely assume that many mis-
takes occur. Id Se also Jackson, supra note 3.
41 Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 495.
42 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at i-ii.
43 Id at 1.
44 Abrams, supra note 1, at 3.
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cies on his or her personal view of the fair and efficient operation of the
criminal justice system,45 the advent of fragmented prosecutorial offices
serving large geographic areas with populations of diverse characteristics
highlights the problem of inconsistent use of discretion and a resulting
need for more specific decision-making criteria. The issue is to what
extent such priorities and policies should be delineated and how to de-
termine appropriate methods of monitoring compliance.
One underlying assumption of this Comment is that written guide-
lines should be made public. When rules and policies are kept secret,
defendants and third parties are unable to discover either arbitrary or
inadvertant departures from them.46 The prosecutor holds his office in
trust 47 for the public good; hence, the prosecutor is and should be sub-
ject to public scrutiny.48 Increased public awareness is essential to
achieving the goals of the criminal justice system.49 Unfortunately, this
researcher's experience indicates that the resources and supplemental di-
rectives provided to federal prosecutors are difficult to obtain and ex-
pensive, if even available, to citizens not employed by the Justice
Department.
Professor Abrams, former consultant to the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, lists the following
factors in favor of publication of specific published guidelines: the desir-
ability of establishing as free a flow of information about governmental
activities as is consistent with national security interests, the benefits of
outside scrutiny, evaluation and criticism of policy, and the fairness of
making departmental policies known and available to all attorneys on
45 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 90. The National District At-
torneys Association asserts that this power is equivalent to the rule-making power possessed
by most administrative agencies. Id Ste also Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 496.
46 K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 98. Davis cites confidential instructions to staffs as maintain-
ing and perpetuating a system in which abuse of discretion is difficult to identify and rectify.
Id
47 Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 498.
48 The public seldom understands or sees prosecutorial discretion. The Wickersham
Commission noted in 1931 that: "[t]he prosecutor [is] the real arbiter of what laws shall be
enforced and against whom, while the attention of the public is drawn rather to the small
percentage of offenders who go through the courts." NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE
AND ENFORCEMENT, No. 4 REPORT ON PROSECUTION 19 (1931).
49 In the area of plea bargaining, for example, the National Advisory Commission recom-
mends that negotiation guidelines be publicized in their entirety. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N
ON CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS, STANDARD 3.3 (1973) [hereinafter NAC:
COURTS]. The ABA, however, recommends confidentiality of the chief prosecutor's strategic
directives. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, STANDARD 2.5(b). Other commentators take a
middle-of-the-road approach and suggest publication of at least a fairly comprehensive state-
ment of plea bargaining and charge reduction. Seegeneraly Thomas & Fitch, supra note 10, at
550. But see Rabin, Ageng Criminal Referrals in the Federal Sstem: An Empirical Study of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REv. 1036 (1972).
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an equal basis.50 He states that absent special circumstances, policy
should be published clearly and concisely. 5 1 The prosecutors promul-
gating these policy statements should take affirmative action to dissemi-
nate them to the public rather than merely make them available upon
request. 5 2 Although the stated purpose of the Justice Department
guidelines includes better informing the public, ostensibly through pub-
lication of departmental policy, the Ptincflles of Federal Prosecution do not
go into adequate detail to assure the public that evenhanded adminis-
tration of the criminal law will be safeguarded. The unavailability of
the supplemental materials disseminated to federal prosecutors high-
lights the apparent inadequacy of the new guidelines.
Also implicit in this evaluation of prosecutorial guidelines is the ne-
cessity for making a record or report of all decisions, including results
and rationales. This allows for monitoring and reviewing decisions as
well as updating policies and procedures.53 Such records prevent a pros-
ecutor from making an "after-the-fact rationalization, based on appar-
ently neutral principles" 54 of his or her decision.
Meaningful control of discretion is impossible without at least some
form of internal administrative review.55 Reduction in the number of
decision-makers effectively controls discretion;56 policy should therefore
be established as high up the ladder of control as possible. In addition
to policy statements, an outline of administrative controls is an essential
component of prosecutorial guidelines.57 The existence of published
policy or guidelines, even when specific, will not alone result in consis-
tent application of the law;58 the important consideration is "whether
the procedure established for the exercise of power furnishes adequate
50 Abrams, supra note 1, at 26-28. Additionally, internal regulation through published
guidelines may preclude movement toward judicial review of all prosecutorial policy and
decisions whether to prosecute. Professor Abrams notes that introduction of judicial review
could interfere with increased development of internal controls. Id at 52.
51 Abrams concedes that legal memoranda, background analysis and manuals on tactics
arguably should not be published. Id at 34 n. 110.
52 Id See also Thomas & Fitch, supra note 10, at 526; Kavanaugh, supra note 8, at 650. For
a discussion of Congressional intent in including law enforcement manuals under the Free-
dom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), see Comment, The Status of
Law Enforcement Manuals Under the Freedom of Information Act, 75 Nw. L. REV. 734 (1980).
53 Thomas & Fitch, suira note 10, at 550.
54 Note, Failure to Prosecute, supra note 33, at 140.
55 Bubany & Skillern, sura note 2, at 503.
56 Thomas & Fitch, supra note 10, at 551. See Merola, Modem Prosecutorial Techniques, 16
CRIM. L. BULL. 232, 256 (1980).
57 Abrams describes administrative controls as necessary to ensure that "policy formu-
lated by higher-ups will be applied by subordinates in the field." Abrams, siupra note 1, at 53.
A system of administrative controls is not an alternative to the explicit articulation of
prosecutorial policy, however. Id at 56.
58 Bubany & Skillern, siupra note 2, at 499.
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safeguards to those who are affected by the administrative action." 59 Ad-
ministrative controls range from placing all authority for certain types
of prosecution in one central authority to delegating almost all authority
to the field. with the invitation to seek advice from central authority if it
has any doubts about prosecuting a particular category of cases.6° A
middle-of-the-road approach requires the field to notify central author-
ity whenever it initiates prosecution of a particular kind of crime.6'
The Principles of Federal Prosecution establish various United States
Attorneys and responsible assistant attorneys general as the "central au-
thority, '62 with the dual purpose of assuring inter-ofte consistency and
providing appropriate remedies for serious, unjustified departures from
the guidelines.63 The document directs these officers to establish supple-
mentary internal procedure guidelines appropriate to their individual
offices. 64 This scant provision for the promotion of inter-office consistency
is inadequate, however. In fact, the guidelines explicitly authorize each
United States attorney to modify or depart from the Principles of Federal
Prosecution .65 Admittedly, while policies theoretically should be equally
appropriate throughout a prosecutorial system, reality mandates an in-
evitable adjustment to meet the varying needs of the individual offices.66
However, while the Principles of Federal Prosecution require the approval of
the appropriate assistant attorney general and the deputy attorney gen-
eral at least in those situations in which "a modification or departure is
contemplated as a matter of policy or regular practice," 67 this important
advancement toward uniformity in the decision-making process at the
federal level becomes meaningless when the guidelines are so general as
to make it virtually impossible to identify departures from "policy."
Unlike the federal guidelines which regulate ninety-five separate of-
fices across the country, state and local policy statements generally need
only encompass prosecutors in a limited geographic area. Consequently,
inter-office consistency is less a consideration at the state and local level
than intra-office uniformity, particularly in the larger offices. In this
compacted situation, it is less necessary to accommodate departures
from policy as the guidelines can be tailored to meet the needs of the
59 Id (citing Warren v. Marion County, 222 Ore. 307, 314, 353 P.2d 257, 261 (1960)).
60 Abrams, supra note 1, at 54-55.
61 Id at 55.
62 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, Part A(3).
63 Id at Part A(3), comment.
64 Id
65 Id at Part A(4).
66 Abrams cites differences in the relative autonomy of various United States Attorney's
offices, caused by differences in size, workload, quality of staff, tradition, and other factors, as
an example of why one administrative control may not apply equally in practice to all offices.
Abrams, supra note 1, at 56.
67 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part A(4), comment.
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jurisdiction in question. Therefore, state and local prosecutors require
more detailed guidelines as well as a stricter procedure for obtaining
permission to depart from office policy, particularly including input
from the chief policy-maker in the jurisdiction to ensure uniformity of
decision.
SELECTING CHARGES, INITIATING, AND DECLINING TO PROSECUTE
One of the most powerful controls a prosecuting attorney has at his
or her disposal is the ability to choose not to act on a given case.8 The
prosecutor's decisions on whether or not to prosecute in effect determine
which laws will be enforced.69 There is no question that the decision to
prosecute lies within the scope of the prosecutor's discretionary power, 70
or that the extent to which the attorneys take advantage of their free-
dom to decline prosecution is very great. A recent study showed that
less than one-fourth of the complaints received by the ninety-five United
68 K. DAvis, supra note 1, at 22. The prosecutor has absolute discretion to bring or drop
charges in a given case. See, e.g., Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 906 (1966), reh. denied, 384 U.S. 967 (1968). See also Vorenberg, supra note 6,
at 678.
69 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). Also known as "screening," this process has been
defined as "the unconditional exclusion of a person from the criminal process prior to trial or
plea." Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 499 (citing NAC: COURTS, supra note 49, at 17).
70 In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 359, 364 (1978), the Court stated that "In our
system, so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an
offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute and what charges to file or
bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely within his discretion." See also Inmates of
Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973), which represents an
unsuccessful attempt to challenge a prosecutor's decision not to charge.
Courts have regularly refused to interfere with voluntary dismissals of prosecution as an
incident of the constitutional separation of powers, and although Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 48(a) permits United States attorneys to dismiss an indictment, information, or
complaint only by leave of court, the courts have interpreted their own role restrictively.
Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 485-86. See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479,
480; Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234; United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). At any rate,
judicial review may be an ineffective method of checking prosecutorial abuse. Cox, supra note
1, at 391. Cox states that the judicial branch's review of all prosecutorial decisions would
create the same evil which the separation of powers doctrine originally sought to prevent; i.e.,
the concentration of unreviewable unchecked power in a single branch of government. Id at
395. But see K DAvis, supra note 1, at 188-91, 225.
Although a trial may provide a review of a prosecutor's decision to prosecute, most crimi-
nal cases never reach trial, largely due to the fact that most prosecutors rely heavily on the
leverage provided by their flexibility to manipulate the charges and to influence the ultimate
disposition of individual cases. Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 481 (citing Note, Prelrial
Diversion From the CriminalProcess, 83 YALE LJ. 827, 838 n.59 (1974)). If a substantial percent-
age of cases were not dropped or carried to administratively negotiated conclusions, justice
would, in the words of the President's Commission, not merely be slowed down, but stopped.
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 130.
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States Attorneys resulted in filing of formal charges. 7 1 The prosecution
rates in state systems for which published data are available are some-
what higher than the federal system, but do not rise much above the
fifty percent mark.7 2 Yet virtually no procedure exists at the local, state,
or federal level to determine if the decisions to decline prosecution are
consistent or fairly made over time. Although the central authority in
Washington must approve the dismissal of a federal prosecution already
initiated in the field, the Department of Justice has not maintained rou-
tine administrative control over decisions to forego prosecution. 73 And,
in state and local offices, there is seldom any control over the decision
not to prosecute. 74 All levels of government therefore need a compre-
hensive declination policy to govern which cases the prosecutor may or
may not decline.
The local or federal prosecutor must determine not only whether he
can convict, but whether he should convict.75 There are a number of
reasons for a prosecutor to forego prosecution on a particular case. 76 No
71 Frase, supra note 5, at 251. The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal
Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S. Department of Justice, Grant No.
75-N1-99-0114, supported the study.
72 Id
73 Abrams, supra note 2, at 54, note 188. Although eighty-three of the ninety-four United
States Attorney's offices have developed their own specific written declination guidelines,
there is little cohesive national policy beyond the PThzciples of Federal Prosecution. The remain-
ing-eleven offices not only have no written guidelines, but admit to making all declination
decisions on a case-by-case basis. DECLINATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19. In this 1979
report, the Department of Justice demonstrated "both notable similarities and striking diflr-
ences across the various United States Attorney's offices with respect to written declination
policies." Id at 4-5. The Justice Department dealt with the issue whether the existing degree
of uniformity or diversity is proper only by requiring "a careful and thorough analysis of the
circumstances confronting each United States Attorney's office and of the various national
policy interests." Id at 5. These differences result in inconsistencies between prosecutorial
and investigative staffs, as well as between offices in different parts of the country. Conse-
quently, in some instances, written guidelines are the result of requests by investigative agen-
cies for more clarity regarding prosecutorial priorities. Id at 26-27.
74 Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 483; Brakel, Diversionfrom the Criminal Proces." Infor-
mal Discretion, Motivation and Formalization, 48 DEN. LJ. 211 (1971); see also PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N, supra note 1, at 133-34.
75 Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 479.
76 LaFave lists eight reasons why a prosecutor may not pursue a case: (1) if harm done by
the offender can be corrected without prosecution; (2) when the offender, if not prosecuted,
will be likely to aid in achieving other enforcement goals; (3) when the mere fact of prosecu-
tion would cause undue harm to the offender; (4) when the costs of prosecution would be
excessive considering the nature of the violation; (5) when the victim has expressed a desire
that the offender not be prosecuted; (6) if there are constraints in available enforcement re-
sources; (7) when the prosecutor feels compelled to individualize justice; or (8) if the legisla-
ture has overcriminalized the act in question. LaFave, supra note 5, at 533.
"Overcriminalized" activities refer to those which tend to be sanctioned by society and law
enforcement officers, and include gambling, drug use, and prostitution. Cox, supra note 1, at
387 (referring to Breitel, supra note 2, at 429). Prosecutors consequently have wide discretion
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prosecutor has enough funds to prosecute all offenders, 77 particularly in
the overburdened District Attorneys' offices. 78 Additionally, the low po-
tential for successfully trying a politically sensitive or highly publicized
case frequently results in dismissal. 79 This calculation necessarily in-
cludes recognition that certain crimes, by their nature, demand a higher
quantum of proof than others to obtain a conviction.80
The discretion available to prosecutors in the arrest and screening
stages preceding the filing of formal charges is even broader than the
more visible forms of discretion occurring at later stages in the criminal
process. 81 This particular facet of discretion is for the most part "unre-
viewed and unreviewable, ''8 2 increasing the potential for abuse. Histori-
cally, prosecutors have made such decisions largely in secret. 83
Consequently, commentators have called for uniform screening and
non-prosecution policies to help solve the problems of disparate treat-
ment under the law.84
The Princples of Federal Prosecution set forth the following courses of
action available to the government attorney once he has probable cause
to believe that a person has committed a federal offense within his juris-
diction: (a) request or conduct further investigation; (b) commence or
recommend prosecution; (c) decline prosecution and refer the matter for
prosecutorial consideration in another jurisdiction; (d) decline prosecu-
tion and initiate or recommend pre-trial-diversion or other non-criminal
disposition; or (e) decline prosecution without taking other action.85
as to investigating or pursuing these "victimless" or "complaintless" crimes. Id See generall'
Cole, supra note 1.
77 LaFave, supra note 5, at 533.
78 See generalo Merola, supa note 56.
79 Kaplan, supra note 9, at 181.
80 Id at 184.
81 Frase, supra note 5, at 246-47.
According to the President's Commission, the prosecutor "wields almost undisputed
sway over the pretrial progress of most cases." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 77.
Additionally, at the federal level, the prosecutor's exercise of discretion in charging is not
subject to control by investigating agencies whose cases he prosecutes. Cox, supra note 1, at
418 (citing Dear Wing Jung v. United States, 312 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1963)).
82 Cox, supra note 1, at 392. See also Bubany & Skillern, supa note 2, at 483-84.
83 Holderman, supa note 5, at 1.
84 The National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, for example, sees
such guidelines as a necessary component of an overall program to correct the disparity of
treatment between rich and poor defendants. THE NEW JUSTICE, supa note 3, at 15. For a
discussion of the barriers to specific guidelines for initiating and declining prosecution and
selecting charges, see Brakel, supra note 74.
85 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, sup-a note 9, at Part B (1). The goal of never charging an innocent
person, a common element in the ABA Standards and Code of Professional Responsibility,
the National Prosecution standards, and the ISBA standards, is ethically satisfied if the prose-
cutor has available a quantum of evidence equalling "probable cause." Kavanaugh, supa
note 8, at 634. For example, Standard 3.9 of the ABA standards suggests that it is "unprofes-
sional conduct for a prosecutor to institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when he
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The probable cause standard is the same standard as that required for
the issuance of an arrest warrant or a summons upon a complaint,8 6 or
for a magistrate's decision to hold a defendant to answer in the district
court,8 7 and is the minimal requirement for indictment by a grand
jury.88 According to the official comment to the Principles of Federal Pros-
ecution, it is a threshold consideration only.89 The guidelines prescribe
commencement of federal prosecution if the prosecutor believes that the
"person's conduct constitutes a federal offense and that the admissible
evidence willprobabo be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction."9o
The guidelines temper this mandate by permitting the prosecutor to de-
cline prosecution even when this standard is met if the prosecution
would serve no substantial federal interest, the defendant is subject to
effective prosecution in another jurisdiction, or there exists an adequate
non-criminal alternative to prosecution.91 The prosecutor need not ob-
tain all the evidence upon which he intends to rely at trial; rather, it is
sufficient that he reasonably believes that such evidence will be avail-
able and admissible at trial.92 Furthermore, "the potential that. . the
fact-finder is likely to acquit the defendant because of the unpopularity
of. . the prosecution or because of the overwhelming popularity of the
defendant or his or her cause should not discourage continuation of a
knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause." ABA STANDARDS, supra note
6, The Prosecution Function, Standard 3.9. See also ISBA STANDARDS, supra note 6; NA-
TIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 131; ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS D.R. 7-103(A). A former Assistant United States Attorney notes that there is general
agreement that, regardless of the strength of the case, a prosecutor has no business going
forward with the case without an actual belief in the guilt of the accused. This is a question
of morality as much as prosecutorial policy. Kaplan, supra note 9, at 178.
The prosecutor is in a unique position to harass defendants despite the fact that decisions
to charge are theoretically reviewed during the pre-trial preliminary hearing and the grand
jury proceedings. The effectiveness of these proceedings as checking devices is doubtful.
Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 843, 492-93.
86 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a).
87 'See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1 (a).
88 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
89 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, Part B(1) comment.
90 Id at Part B(2) (emphasis added). Several commentators suggest that a standard of
probable cause is inadequate because the amount of evidence sufficient to demonstrate proba-
ble cause may be inadequate to defeat a defendant's motion for directed verdict. Kavanaugh,
supra note 8, at 634; Kaplan, supra note 9, at 182. Kaplan noted that if the government's
evidence did not seem sufficient to escape a directed verdict, all of the Assistant United States
Attorneys in his office agreed that the prosecution should, of course, not be undertaken. Id
A more stringent standard for guiding the prosecutor in the exercise of the charging discretion
has been suggested as an alternative: "[C]harge those defendants with those crimes for which
there exists sufficient evidence to prove every element of the crime charged, unless there is a
substantial doubt that evidence needed to prove the elements of a prima facie case will either
not be admitted or not be believed." Kavanaugh, supra note 8, at 635.
91 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, Part B(2).
92 Id at Part B(2), comment.
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sound case. 93
Although the guidelines include these elaborations in the official
comment, they fail to include specific benchmarks for the prosecutor to
follow and thus, without further elaboration, fail to solve the disparity
in application problem.94 They certainly fail to meet the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement's recommendation that policy-makers
establish explicit policies for the dismissal or informal disposition of the
cases of certain marginal offenders.95 Such factors can, however, be
quantified. For example, the Bronx County, New York District Attor-
ney's office employs a numerical case evaluation system that assigns nu-
merically weighted values to certain criteria that reflect the policies and
priorities of the office.96 This system evaluates a case in four essential
respects: the nature of the crime charged, determined by the grade of
felony involved; the gravity of the particular offense, primarily deter-
mined by the extent of personal injury and property loss or damage; the
propensity of the defendant to commit crimes of violence, primarily de-
termined by the nature of his background and prior criminal record;
and the strength of the case, primarily determined by the facts, circum-
stances and available evidence.97 Any prosecutor's office can adapt the
case evaluation system, and according to the Bronx County District At-
torney, the system represents an effective method for screening out those
cases in which selective prosecution might be appropriate. 98 Addition-
ally, by focusing a great deal of attention on the case at the precise mo-
ment it becomes part of the system, the prosecutor acquires and
93 Id
94 See Gross & Maloney, upra note 5, at 27. Gross and Maloney cite the following exam-
ple:
[l]t is likely that the U.S. attorney for the Northern District of Florida believes that
prosecution of a first offender for forging a U.S. Treasury check would serve a "federal
interest," while the U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York probably be-
lieves that same forger should be placed in a deferred prosecution program. As a result,
while the Florida forger may receive a federal prison term, the New York forger will not
even be prosecuted.
Id Gross and Maloney suggest a more specific guideline to combat evasion of the evenhanded
administration of the federal criminal laws; e.g., placing a person who forges one U.S. Treas-
ury check in a deferred prosecution program unless he has a prior criminal record. Id
The guidelines issued by the ABA, National District Attorneys Association and ISBA
also fail to adequately direct the prosecuting attorney as to which cases, as a rule, should be
pursued and which should be forgone, although all "implicitly recognize the impossibility of
prosecuting all criminals, and explicitly reject any obligation to refrain from prosecuting an
individual who might possibly be found innocent at a trial." Kavanaugh, sufra note 8, at
632.
95 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note I, at 134.
96 Merola, supra note 56, at 237.
97 Id at 237-38. For a more complete summary of this process, Merola cites to the NA-
TIONAL CENTER FOR PROSEcUTriON MANAGEMENT, REPORT TO THE BRONX CouNTY Dis-
TRICT ATTORNEY ON THE CASE EvALUATION SYSTEM (Nov. 30, 1974).
98 Id at 238.
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maintains full control over all aspects of the case through final disposi-
tion, thereby ensuring the integrity and consistency of office policy.99
Although the Prnciples of Federal Prosecution direct the prosecutor to
consider the particular offender's culpability in connection with the of-
fense,'0° the past record of criminal activity,' 0 ' the willingness to cooper-
ate in the investigation or prosecution of others, 0 2 and the probable
sentence or other consequences of conviction, t0 3 they also instruct the
prosecutor to weigh federal law enforcement priorities, 0 4 the nature and
seriousness of the offense, 10 5 and the deterrent effect of prosecution 0 6 in
determining whether to decline prosecution for want of substantial fed-
eral interest.' 0 7 Without more elaboration, prosecutors at the state and
local level attempting to adhere to similar guidelines would not know
what constituted an enforcement priority other than perhaps by a "gut
feeling" as to which crimes occurred most frequently or posed the great-
est problem to the community. An individual public prosecutor without
further direction cannot determine what impact a crime will have on a
community or how serious it actually is relative to all other crimes prose-
cuted in the particular jurisdiction. The Justice Department's rather
weak admonition that "some offenses, although seemingly not of great
importance by themselves, if commonly committed would have a sub-
99 Id at 238-39.
100 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part B(3)(d).
101 Id at Part B(3)(e).
102 Id at Part B(3)().
103 Id at Part B (3)(g). The influence of the court, i.e., the sentencing history of a particu-
lar judge, cannot be underestimated. Cole, supra note 1, at 337.
104 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part B(3)(a).
105 Id at Part B(3)(b).
106 Id at Part B(3)(c).
107 Id These factors roughly correspond to those proposed by the National Advisory Com-
mission, although the Commission recommends that where possible, such guidelines should
identify even more specifically where those factors considered in the decision to take the ac-
cused into custody or pursue formal proceedings. NAC: COURTS, supra note 49, Standard
1.2.
These latter considerations, when made on an individual basis, are precisely the sort of
factors which may lead to disparity and inconsistency in application of the law'on a jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction basis, however, and may be inadequate at the federal level, also. While
there may be a tendency for prosecutors within a particular office to form a general consensus
as to which cases should or should not be prosecuted, it is highly unlikely that without further
elaboration, prosecutors between offices can make consistent judgements as to the latter three
considerations. See Kaplan, supra note 9, at 177. Although some data indicate that those
United States Attorneys who developed their own written guidelines are influenced by "na-
tional law enforcement priorities," these priorities are communicated haphazardly to the
prosecutors through a hodge-podge of sources. See text accompanying notes 16-20supra. It is
difficult to conceive of consistent application of the law on a national basis under these cir-
cumstances, particularly when national declination guidelines are feasible and preferable.
DECLINATION GUIDELINES, supra note 19. The guidelines should constitute revisions to the
Principles of Federal Prosecution, and be uniformly and regularly disseminated as such.
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stantial cumulative impact on the community"' 0 8 does not provide such
direction.
Finally, while a prosecutor may be in a fairly good position to de-
termine the deterrent effect of prosecution on a specific defendant, the
lack of a cohesive and unified program to guide the entire prosecutorial
force as a unit decreases the likelihood of consistent prosecution follow-
ing commission of a particular offense. This in turn decreases the deter-
rence factor generally on other potential offenders in the community.
Other American organizations' proposed guidelines on the decision
to prosecute do not differ markedly from the Pin'ciples of Federal Prosecu-
tion. For example, the American Bar Association Standards state in
part:
(a) It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to institute or cause
to be instituted criminal charges when he knows that the charges are not
supported by probable cause.
(b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the
evidence might support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and
for good cause consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute,
notwithstanding that evidence may exist which would support a convic-
tion. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider
in exercising his discretion are:
(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact
guilty;
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense;
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to
the particular offense of the offender;
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant;
(v) reluctance of the victim to testify;
(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension and conviction
of others;
(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdic-
tion. 109
While factors (i), (ii), (iii) and (vi) roughly correspond to guidelines
B (3) (d), B (3) (b), B (3) (g) and B (3) () 110 respectively, they do not require
individual prosecutors to determine such nebulous policy considerations
as law enforcement priorities or the deterrent effect- of prosecution.111
The upper echelons of the policy-making body should establish priori-
ties and determine the deterrent effect of prosecution and then dissemi-
nate this information to individual prosecutors as concrete guidelines.
108 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part B(3)(c).
109 ABA STANDARDS, sup a note 6, The Prosecution Function Standard 3.9.
110 See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9.
111 The possible deterrent value of prosecution is, however, a listed consideration in the
National District Attorney Association's standards. NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS,
supra note 6, Standard 9.3.
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These considerations should not be made subconsciously or without gui-
dance. For example, although the prosecutor's caseload is a valid con-
sideration in the charging decision, its inclusion creates a number of
problems in establishing a uniform charging policy. 112 Among proposed
solutions are: (1) preventing the prosecutor from declining to file other-
wise justified charges solely on the basis of caseload considerations; (2)
enumerating various offenses for which the prosecutor may decline to
charge solely because of caseload factors, and additional designated of-
fenses for which the prosecutor must consult with his superiors before
deciding not to charge; and (3) limiting the prosecutor to considering his
caseload only for offenses in which there is already a high dismissal rate
or informal noncharging policy. 113
Neither the American Bar Association guidelines nor the Justice
Department principles focus upon the individual type or category of de-
cision; i.e. the guidelines are not "situation-specific."' 114 Yet the nature
of the alleged offense is an easily codified factor.' 15 Use of hypotheticals
can accomplish much more than a mere listing of broad generalizations
characterized as "guiding principles."' 16 One commentator gave the
following example:
It is the policy of this office that charges arising out of domestic disputes
shall be nolled where discussion with the complaining spouse indicates that
(i) the spouse does not wish to press charges; (ii) there is no indicated his-
tory of prior incidents of a similar nature; (iii) no physical injury or serious
threat thereof occurred or no weapon was involved; and (iv) the case is
otherwise not serious enough to warrant referral to Family Relations.1 17
Consideration of personal characteristics is often very subjective, but
writers have formulated policies providing more concrete guidance than
the American Bar Association guidelines or the Principles of Federal Prose-
cution, for example:
Prosecutions shall not be undertaken by this office in cases where the de-
fendant has no previous record and the charging assistant is reasonably
sure that the alleged criminal behaviour was induced by extreme but non-
recurring emotional distress, except that charges will be filed in such in-
stances in which the alleged criminal activity constitutes a felony (or a
certain class of felonies) unless the chief prosecutor (or designated senior
assistant) approves the application of this policy in the particular case.
Prosecutions shall be deferred by this office, except in (certain felonies)
where the defendant is addicted to narcotics (or mentally retarded, or a
112 Thomas & Fitch, supra note 10, at 521.
113 Id
114 Id at 518 (citing W. Davis, Nolle Prosequi in the Sixth Circuit Court: Prosecutor Dis-
cretion to Dispence with Charge 91 (1974) (unpublished thesis in Yale Law School Library)).
115 Id
116 K. DAvis, supra note 1, at 63.
117 Thomas & Fitch, supra note 10, at 518 (citing W. Davis, supra note 114, at 89-90).
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mentally retarded juvenile) if the defendant voluntarily enters a treatment
program previously approved by this office, successfully completes a -
day program of treatment, and during that period is not charged with
another crime.18
In the Princi.ples of Federal Prosecution, the Justice Department sug-
gests evaluating the nature and seriousness of the offense in terms of the
economic, physical and psychological impact on the victim, but cautions
against the impression that an offender can escape prosecution merely
by returning the spoils of his crime." 9 However, firm guidelines as to
which criminal offenses are negotiable based upon the victim's plight
and which are not would do more to alleviate this undesirable impres-
sion and are essential at the local level. For example, prosecutors often
feel that non-criminal processes can better deal with the medical,
mental, or social problems of many first offenders. 120 Those crimes in
which such diversion is appropriate for first or repeat offenders must be
set out.
There is considerable room for abuse of the government's directive
that federal prosecutors decline to prosecute if an adequate non-crimi-
nal alternative to prosecution exists 121 because such alternatives sacrifice
the formality and visibility generally associated with conventional court
procedures. 122 Consequently, these alternatives, which rely heavily
upon unregulated and broad discretionary exercises of power by prose-
cutors and others, 23 may deny the values inherent in constitutional
equal protection and due process.' 24
Although the discretion to divert may constitute a valid exercise of
discretion, 25 pre-trial diversion is justifiable only if it results in an allo-
cation of resources more likely to achieve the goals of criminal justice
than the traditional system. 126 Despite its importance, the use of this
118 Id at 520-21.
119 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part B(3)(b), comment.
120 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, ,wipra note 1, at 133.
121 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, sufira note 9, at Part B(5). See generaly Note, Retrial Diversion From
the Criminal Arocess, supra note 70.
122 D.E. AARONSON, ALTERNATIVES TO CONVENTIONAL CRIMINAL ADJUDICATION:
GUIDEBOOK FOR PLANNERS AND PRACTITIONERS 5 (Nat'l Inst. of Law Enforcement and
Crim. Just. 1975).
123 Cox, supra note 1, at 432; D.E. AARONSON, supra note 122, at 5.
124 THE NEW JUSTICE, supra note 3, at xi.
125 Cox, supra note 1, at 432. Several suits challenging the prosecutor's role in the initial
decision to divert failed. Id (citing Sledge v. Superior Court of San Diego, 11 Cal. 3d 70, 520
P.2d 412, 113 Cal. Rptr. 28 (1974) (en banc); People v. Superior Court at San Mateo County,
11 Cal. 3d 59, 520 P.2d 405, 113 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1974)). For a general discussion of the need
for pre-trial diversion, see PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, sura note 1, at 133-34.
126 Thomas & Fitch, supra note 10, at 532. The objectives of pre-trial diversion are to
reduce recidivism, relieve overburdened court dockets, avoid the expense of criminal proceed-
ings and incarceration, and provide to appropriate persons services which more directly ad-
dress the causes of their criminal behavior than would imprisonment. Id at 530.
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power has proceeded largely without standards or articulated goals at
the local and federal levels. 127 While society should vest some discretion
in the prosecutor to compensate for certain laws written in an attempt to
apply criminal sanctions as social controls over problems which might
be more appropriately handled administratively or through other
means,' 28 the potential that a prosecutor may "extort from defendants
agreement to potentially onerous conditions"'129 mandates that stan-
dards be developed establishing the types of cases for which diversion is
appropriate and procedures for approval of the diversion decision.
130
Frequently, these decisions are unreviewable.' 3 1 In determining who
will be conventionally processed and who will be diverted, the prosecu-
tor needs guidelines to limit unchecked discretion.' 3
2
The Princzwles of Federal Prosecution, rather than setting out offenses
appropriate for pre-trial diversion, deal only in generalities. At the very
least, policy-makers must define the class of offenders to be diverted, the
goals of diversion and the services best suited to meeting these goals.133
While the federal guidelines supply broad criteria concerning the de-
fendant in general,13 4 they do not set out specific factors pertaining
solely to diversion. The National Advisory Commission took a different
approach by suggesting the following criteria as indicators that diver-
sion not be used: any history of the use of physical violence toward
others, involvement with syndicated crime, a history of antisocial con-
duct indicating that such conduct has become an ingrained part of the
defendant's lifestyle and would be particularly resistant to change, and
any special need to pursue criminal prosecution as a means of discourag-
ing others from committing similar offenses.' 3 5 The Commission also
listed seven more detailed administrative control policies applicable to
cases where the diversion program involves significant deprivation of an
offender's liberty: (1) The offender's right to be represented by counsel
127 Cox, supra note 1, at 431. See also Comment, Pretrial Diversrion: The Threat of Expanding
Social Control, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 180, 183 (1975).
128 Cox, supra note 1, at 388.
129 Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 501.
130 Id
131 THE NEW JUSTICE, supra note 3, at 37.
132 D.E. AARONSON, supra note 122, at 5. Arguably, the ultimate success of the diversion-
ary process will turn on the quality of the decision-makers themselves. Id See general4' State
v. Leonardis, 71 N.J. 85, 363 A.2d 321 (1976) for an overview of a statewide pre-trial interven-
tion program. The court in this case called for uniform guidelines to be promulgated by the
Court in the implementation of the program, condemning prosecutors. Id at 340.
133 Id
134 See text accompanying notes 100-102 supra.
135 NAC: COURTS, supra note 49, Standard 2.1. One additional factor to be considered in
evaluating the cost to society is that the limited contact a diverted offender has with the
criminal justice system may have the desired deterrent effect. Id This is an important con-
sideration in evaluating the goal of specific deterrence.
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during negotiations for diversion deserves emphasis; (2) Administrators
should not permit suspension of criminal prosecution for longer than
one year; (3) Administrators should not approve an agreement that pro-
vides for a substantial period of institutionalization unless the court
specifically finds that the defendant is subject to nonvoluntary detention
in the institution under noncriminal statutory authorizations for such
institutionalization; (4) The court must receive an agreement containing
a full statement of those things expected of the defendant and the reason
for diverting him; (5) The court should approve an offered agreement
only if approvable under the applicable criteria for a negotiated plea of
guilty; (6) Upon expiration of the agreement, the court should dismiss
the prosecution and permit no future prosecution based on the conduct
underlying the initial charge; and (7) For the duration of the agreement,
the discretionary authority to determine whether the offender is per-
forming his duties adequately under the agreement must vest in the
prosecutor, and if he determines that the offender is not performing
properly, he must have the ability to reinstate the prosecution.136 A
comprehensive set of guidelines should include such explicit directives.
The promulgator of local guidelines must keep abreast of alternative
civil and administrative remedies provided by various state legislatures
and local authorities and inform prosecutors of these alternatives on an
on-going basis.
In an effort to avoid discriminatory application of the law such as
that evidenced in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,137 the federal guidelines prohibit
consideration of the prosecutor's personal feelings and motivations in
determining whether to commence or recommend prosecution, 138 and
also condemn the influence of the offender's race, religion, sex, national
136 Id at Standard 2.2.
137 Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) was the first case involving a successful de-
fense of discriminatory prosecution. The Court held the administration of a municipal ordi-
nance to regulate public laundries violative of equal protection because it was systematically
arbitrary and unjustly discriminatory on the basis of race. While this case involved adminis-
trative activity as opposed to prosecutorial action, it appears applicable to prosecutorial deci-
sion-making because of the law enforcement nature of the administration action with which it
deals. Cox, sufira note 1, at 403.
The Supreme Court has also held, however, that the "conscious exercise of some selectiv-
ity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation." Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S.
448 (1962). In 0yler, the Supreme Court upheld a state recidivist statute despite the fact that
only a selected few to whom the statute applied had the heavier penalty enforced against
them. Id Oler has resulted in two requirements of proof in an action for discriminatory
prosecution: a showing that others in the same or similar position have not been prosecuted,
and that the knowing discrimination was based on an unjustifiable standard. Id at 456.
However, according to one commentator, cases have illustrated that it is very difficult to
prove an unjustifiable or impermissible standard. Comment, Duplicative Statutes, supra note 1,
at 231-32.
138 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part B(6).
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origin, political associations, activities, or beliefs on the prosecutor's de-
cisions. 139 Still, without more adequate guidelines for making such de-
terminations, it becomes virtually impossible to know how much
influence any of the above factors may have had upon the prosecutor.
If state and local prosecutors' offices adopted the Pnc/les of Federal
Prosecution without change, prosecutors failing to adhere to these ambig-
uous guidelines could become subject to remedial procedures after mak-
ing decisions. 14 However, as the guidelines do not provide for either an
internal or external reviewing authority,14 1 chief prosecutors probably
could not rectify or discover mistakes or abuse. The requirement of ex-
plicitly stating the reasons for declining prosecution and placing them
on file 142 becomes virtually meaningless for this purpose although it
helps alleviate some difficulties in penetrating the prosecutor's shield
against liability in a charge of discriminatory prosecution. 43
Rule C (1) of the Principles of Federal Prosecution directs the prosecutor
to charge, or recommend that the grand jury charge, the most serious
offense consistent with the nature of the defendant's conduct and which
is most likely to result in a sustainable conviction.1 44 According to the
Justice Department, this principle provides the framework for guaran-
teeing that every defendant will start from the same position charged
with the most serious criminal act he commits. 1 45 The official comment
tempers this flat rule, however, by stating that in many instances unusu-
ally mitigating circumstances may make the specified penalty appear so
out of proportion to the seriousness of the defendant's conduct that the
attorney for the government should consider charging a different of-
139 Id One commentator argues that while case law, without exception, holds only inten-
tional discrimination violative of the equal protection clause of the United States Constitu-
tion, significant reasons exist for extending the right to certain forms of unintentional
discrimination as well. Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Initiation of Cn'minal Complaints,
42 So. CAL. L. REV. 519, 543 (1969).
140 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part B(7).
141 Review of decisions at the federal level, often made by assistant United States Attor-
neys, seldom occurs unless a dispute arises either at the time of the decision or afterward.
Kaplan, supra note 9, at 176. The same is true at the state and local level. See generaly Cox,
supra note 1, at 393.
142 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part B(7). Davis advocates recording reasons for
declining prosecution in the interest of evenhandedness and openness. K. DAVIS, supra note 1,
at 225, 226. See also ABA STANDARDS, The Prosecution Function, supra note 6, Standard 4.4.,
which states: "Whenever felony criminal charges are dismissed by way ofnolleprosequi (or its
equivalent), the prosecutor should make a record of the reasons for the action."
143 The challenger, to formulate a claim, must show that a prosecution was brought in a
knowingly discriminatory fashion based on an unjustifiable standard. See also note 137 supra.
144 DEP'T OFJUSTICE,supra note 9, at Part C(I). Typically, a defendant will have commit-
ted more than one criminal act and his conduct may be prosecuted under more than one
statute. Id See also Duplicative Statutes, supra note 1.




The rules further direct government attorneys to bring additional
charges only when such charges are necessary to ensure that the indict-
ment will reflect the nature and extent of the defendant's criminal con-
duct or will provide the basis for an appropriate sentence given all the
circumstances of a particular case. 147 Additionally, government attor-
neys may bring such charges if they will significantly enhance the
strength of the government's case against the defendant or a
codefendent.14 8 These directives are apparently designed to ensure that
a prosecutor does not add charges for which evidence is weak to acquire
additional leverage in the plea bargaining process.
14 9
ENTERING INTO PLEA AGREEMENTS AND NON-PROSECUTION
AGREEMENTS
The prosecutor's ability to plea bargain15 0 encompasses a very
broad range of options. 15' By its very nature, plea bargaining is impossi-
ble without wide prosecutorial discretion. 152 The law recognizes plea
bargaining as a necessary and legitimate component of the American
criminal justice system; 153 Rule 11 (e) (1) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure explicitly sanctions negotiated plea dispositions. 154 The
Supreme Court has not wholeheartedly endorsed plea bargaining,
146 Id
147 Id at Part C(2)(a).
148 I at Part C(2)(b).
149 Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 480-82. See also LaFave, supra note 5, at 541.
150 "Plea bargaining" involves active negotiation whereby the defendant offers to exchange
a guilty plea, thereby forfeiting his right to trial, for a charge reduction or sentence recom-
mendation from the prosecutor. LaGoy, Senna & Siegal, An Empirical Study on Information Us-
agefor Prosecutorial Decision Making in Plea Negotiations, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 435, 436 (1976).
The plea of guilty is probably the most frequent method of conviction in all jurisdictions.
ABA STANDARDS, Pleas of Guilty, supra note 6, at 299.
151 The plea bargaining process is a critical stage of the criminal justice system at which
discretionary decisions affecting the majority of defendants and the entire system occur.
LaGoy, Senna & Siegal, supra note 150, at 436. According to Cox, the prosecutor is generally
free to (I) prosecute on less than the full number of charges; (2) prosecute on a lesser charge
which one or more of the given charges includes; (3) drop the present charges and bring less
severe ones; (4) drop one or more cases filed against any one defendant and prosecute less
than the full number; (5) drop subsidiary charges which he could bring against the defendant
as a release offender, or repeat offender, or for any offenses against bail laws, gun laws or drug
laws; or (6) promise to make no sentencing recommendation. Cox, supra note 2, at 426. Of
course, the absolute right to trial provides a constant limit on the prosecutor's bargaining
power in plea discussions. ABA STANDARDS, The Prosecution Function, supra note 6, at 80.
152 Herrmann, supra note 2, at 474.
153 See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971) in which the court said Plea
bargaining, 'broperry administered, . . is to be encouraged." Id at 260 (emphasis added). See
also LaGoy, Senna & Siegel, sfupra note 150, ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, Plea of Guilty
Standard 1.8; Thomas & Fitch, supra note 10, at 545.
154 Rule 11(e)(1) provides that:
1981]
COMMENTS [Vol. 72
though, 55 in part because plea bargaining entails great potential for the
unequal exercise of discretion. 156 Some commentators suggest abolition
of plea bargaining in the belief that reforms are incapable of correcting
the deficiencies of the process.157 Others merely note that reform is nec-
essary because plea bargaining frequently results in unequal treatment
of similarly situated defendants with a detrimental impact on the adver-
sary process. 158 This is particularly true since the process is typically
informal and private. 159
Plea bargaining generally depends to a large degree on the prosecu-
tor's discretion to determine whether or not to grant a defendant charg-
ing or sentencing concessions.' 60 The court has no control over the
The attorney for the government and the attorney for the defendant or the defend-
ant when acting pro se may engage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agree-
ment that, upon the entering of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense
or to a lesser or related offense, the attorney for the government will do any of the follow-
ing:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's request, for a
particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommendation or request shall
not be binding upon the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case.
FED. R. CRIM. P. l1(e)(1).
155 Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 482.
156 For example, in one study, prosecutors in low population density jurisdictions used
more information and seemed more likely to accept bargains than their metropolitan counter-
parts. LaGoy, Senna & Siegal, supra note 150, at 435-37. The Bronx County District Attor-
ney noted that:
Rather than being in accord with office wide policies which reflect the district attorney's
priorities, the plea bargain is often motivated by desperation at the collapse of a case
which has been unreasonably delayed, the existence of a backlog of cases, the inclination
of a particular assistant, or the philosophy of a particular judge, compounded by pres-
sure from the court administration to dispose of cases as quickly as possible.
Merola, supra note 56, at 256. See also K. DAVIS, supra note 1, at 167-70 (discussing selective
enforcement in general); White, .4 Proposalfor Reform of/he Plea Bargaining Process, 118 U. PA. L.
REv. 439, 449 (1971). But see Kavanaugh, sura note 8, at 644-45, arguing that the role of the
prosecutor in the plea bargaining process must be put in perspective as it is the court which
ultimately determines the defendant's fate.
157 D.E. AARONSON, supra note 122, at 70-71. The National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals suggests total elimination on the grounds that it will
remove incentives to overcharge, will not substantially increase the number of trials, and will
increase the rationality of the system. Id The National District Attorneys Association, on the
other hand, voted to reject the NAC's proposal. Id (citing 16 CRIM. L. REP. 2427 (1974)).
158 See, e.g., Thomas & Fitch, supra note 10, at 546; Note, Plea Bargaining: The Case for
Reform, 6 U. RICH. L. REV. 325 (1972). One commentator suggests, in addition to requiring
the promulgation of specific guidelines by individual offices, that state legislatures might also
take action to limit prosecutorial discretion in this area. He suggests, for example, that a
legislature might find plea bargaining permissible only when the prosecutor determines that
he needs information and testimony from one defendant against others whose conviction is
more important. Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 682. He further calls for public reports on each
use of this grant of bargaining authority to enable the legislature to determine whether fur-
ther legislative action need be taken. Id
159 See general4y K. KIPNIS, PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN LAW 280-96 (1977).
160 LaGoy, Senna & Siegel, supra note 150, at 436-37.
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initial charge brought by the prosecutor, so in cases where a bargain is
struck before any charges are filed, there is no judicial supervisor
preventing undesirable reduction of a charge. 161 The authors of one
major study concluded:
[T]he major impression with which one is left is that of prosecutorial indi-
viduality. This is certainly consistent with traditional predictions of wide
prosecutorial discretion. But the degree to which information selection,
sorting and weighing vary even within the same office tends to confirm the
worse fears of critics-that equal defendants will receive unequal treat-
ment from prosecutors seated at opposite sides of the same desk.162
Furthermore, prosecutorial misconduct in this process will fre-
quently go undetected and unpunished, much as in the diversion deci-
sions. 163 In many cases, the bargained plea, and not the process,
becomes an end in itself, defeating the goal of individualized justice in
the name of expediency. 164 Critics have charged that permitting prose-
cutors to engage in plea bargaining has certain inherent dangers and
problems: (1) misunderstandings between the prosecutor and the de-
fendant which are dangerous and difficult to prove and rectify; 165
(2) secret bargaining talks which hamper public awareness of the justice
system;166 (3) contempt on the part of criminals for a system ofjustice in
which they can negotiate and get off easily;167 (4) a chilling effect which
makes innocent defendants fear trial because judges are more lenient in
sentencing those who plead guilty in comparison to those who were
found guilty; i8 (5) overcharging defendants with the intent of bargain-
ing down to the crime prosecutors feel is really at issue;169 and (6) coer-
cion of guilty pleas.' 70 Moreover, nobody knows the actual manner in
which the prosecutor comes to a decision about disposing of a case. 171
161 K. KIPNIS, supra note 159, at 281.
162 See general, Thomas, supra note 10.
163 Cox, supra note 1, at 428.
164 Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 482.
165 Cox, supra note 1, at 429. See also Note, Legitimation of Plea Bargaining: Remediesfor Broken
Promises, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 771, 780-82 (1973).
166 Cox, supra note 1, at 429; see also Note, Plea Bargaining: The Case for Reform, supra note
158, at 328.
167 Cox, supra note 1, at 429.
168 Id
169 Id See also LeFave, supra note 5, at 535-36; Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bar-
gaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 111 (1968).
170 LaGoy, Senna & Siegel, sura note 150, at 435. See also People v. Byrd, 12 Mich. App.
186, 162 N.W.2d 777 (1968) (Levin, J., concurring). The arguments in favor of permitting
the practice correspond to the arguments put forth to justify prosecutorial discretion gener-
ally, with the additional considerations that rehabilitative goals are furthered by the defend-
ant's admission of guilt and that deterrence and respect for the criminal justice system are
enhanced by the certainty and promptness of punishment associated with plea bargaining.
ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 299-301.
171 LaGoy, Senna & Siegel, supra note 150, at 437. The amount, type and quality of infor-
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Few guidelines were available to federal prosecutors prior to the issu-
ance of the Przciples of Federal Prosecution ,172 and virtually none exist for
local and state prosecutors.' 7
3
The Justice Department guidelines provide that the prosecutor
may, in an "appropriate" case, enter into an agreement conditioned
upon the defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense;
i.e. the prosecutor may agree to move for dismissal of other charges or
take a certain position with respect to the sentence to be imposed. 174
The American Bar Association Standards define "appropriate" as "cases
in which it appears that the interest of the public in the effective admin-
istration of criminal justice would thereby be served ....
The Pinciples of Federal Prosecution suggest in more detail eleven con-
siderations to be weighed by the prosecutor in determining whether to
enter into a plea agreement. Rule D(2) provides:
In determining whether it would be appropriate to enter into a plea
agreement, the attorney for the government should weigh all relevant con-
siderations, including:
(a) the defendant's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or
prosecution of others;
(b) the defendant's history with respect to criminal activity;
mation used to reach the agreement is seldom analyzed; furthermore, it is unclear whether
differences exist between jurisdictions or among prosecutors within a single jurisdiction. Id
The President's Commission called plea bargaining an "invisible procedure," and stated that
"neither the dignity of the law, nor the quality of justice, nor the protection of society from
dangerous criminals is enhanced by it being conducted covertly." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N,
supra note I, at 78. Another commentator noted that
The defendant's interest in receiving as low a sentence as possible and the prosecutor's
interest in maintaining a steady flow of guilty pleas ... can easily merge into agreement
upon a guilty plea in return for a sentence that is meaningless in terms of the defendant's
offense and his need for treatment or control.
K. KIPNIS, supra note 159, at 285.
For comprehensive studies on what factors influence prosecutorial decision-making, see
D. NEWMAN, CONVIcrrION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT
TRIAL 8 (1966); Kaplan, supra note 9; LaGoy, Senna & Siegel, supra note 150.
172 See Kaplan, supra note 9; White, supra note 156, at 465. White concluded that the lack
of any concrete policy as to how prosecutorial decisions are made in U.S. Attorney's offices
tends to produce differential handling of similarly charged defendants, and called for the
early development of clearly defined plea bargaining policies.
173 One notable exception is the development of standardized procedures in Bronx
County, New York. See general(y Merola, supra note 56, at 255-58.
174 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part D(1) (emphasis added). The function of a
prosecutor's discretion to charge and to dismiss includes his discretion to engage in plea bar-
gaining. Cox, supra note 1, at 425. The Supreme Court declared this particular discretion
power both constitutional, citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), and desirable.
The Department of Justice distinguished such negotiated dispositions from situations in
which a defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere to fewer than all counts of an information or
indictment in the absence of any agreement with the government. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra
note 9, at Part D(1) comment.
175 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, Pleas of Guilty Standard 3.1.
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(c) the nature and seriousness of the offense or offenses charged;
(d) the defendant's remorse or contrition and his willingness to as-
sume responsibility for his conduct;
(e) the desirability of prompt and certain disposition of the case;
(f) the likelihood of obtaining a conviction at trial;
(g) the probable effect on witnesses;
(h) the probable sentence or other consequences if the defendant is
convicted;
(i) the public interest in having the case tried rather than disposed of
by a guilty plea;
() the expense of trial and appeal; and
(k) the need to avoid delay in the disposition of other pending
cases.
176
The government then adds that this provision does not suggest the desir-
ability or lack of desirability of a plea agreement in any particular
case.' 77 Nor does the listing of considerations reflect the merits of any
plea agreement that actually may be reached;178 its purpose is "solely to
assist attorneys for the government in exercising their judgment as to
whether some sort of plea agreement would be appropriate in a particu-
lar case." 179
No directive for uniformity exists in this watered-down assistance
guideline. Without supplemental guidelines, standardization of the plea
bargaining process is virtually impossible. Measurable criteria and
sanctions for deviating from these criteria are mandatory. Although
flexibility is a necessary component of the process, perhaps to a greater
extent than in any other facet of prosecutorial decision-making, the Jus-
tice Department refuses to even suggest the desirability or lack thereof of
situations based upon these eleven criteria. 80 State and local guidelines
must avoid hedging on the critical issue of inconsistent and improper
176 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, sufira note 9, at Part D(2).
177 Id at Part D(2) comment. According to Cox, there are a number of additional factors
which encourage rather than limit the use of plea bargaining techniques by prosecutors, mak-
ing a plea bargain more desirable in a given case. She lists the pressure of a heavy case load,
the desire to win; i.e., to get some kind of conviction even if for a lesser offense, the prosecu-
tor's need to get along with other members of the criminal justice system, and the desire to
mitigate penalties considered too harsh for a particular crime, defendant, or set of circum-
stances. Cox, supra note 1, at 425-26.
178 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part D(2) comment.
179 Id
180 The Bronx County District Attorney's office departed completely from traditional plea
bargaining procedures to ensure internal consistency and decrease external pressures on the
individual prosecutors. Whenever an indictment is secured in Bronx County, the entire case
is sent directly to an innovative Plea Recommendation Board. The Board consists of exper-
ienced prosecutors who control the key functions which occur at each of the critical stages in
the development of a case; thus, each case is scrutinized by specialists who consider every
aspect of the case and assign the appropriate weight to every fact and circumstance relevant
to the crime. Merola, supra note 56, at 256.
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bargains and address the problem through comprehensive and detailed
guidelines.
Section 1.8 of the American Bar Association Standards provides the
following more elaborate considerations in determining the public inter-
est:
(i) that the defendant by his plea has aided in ensuring the
prompt and certain application of correctional measures to him;
(ii) that the defendant has acknowledged his guilt and shown a
willingness [to] assume responsibility for his conduct;
(iii) that the concessions will make possible alternative correc-
tional measures which are better adapted to achieving rehabilitative,
protective, deterrent or other purposes of correctional treatment, or will
prevent undue harm to the defendant from the form of conviction;
(iv) that the defendant has made public trial unnecessary when
there are good reasons for not having the case dealt with in a public
trial;
(v) that the defendant has given or offered cooperation when such
cooperation has resulted or may result in the successful prosecution of
other offenders engaged in equally serious or more serious criminal con-
duct;
(vi) that the defendant by his plea has aided in avoiding delay
(including delay due to crowded dockets) in the disposition of other
cases and thereby certain application of correctional measures to other
offenders. 18 1
Unlike the American Bar Association Standards above and the
Pznzczles of Federal Prosecution, the National Advisory Commission's rec-
ommendation specifically says that the statement of policies should pro-
vide that a prosecutor may not consider weaknesses in his case in
determining whether to permit a defendant to plead guilty to any of-
fense other than that charged.1 82 Despite its antagonism to the plea bar-
gaining process in general, the Commission recommends that attorneys
engaged in plea negotiations consider the following:
(1) The impact that a formal trial would have on the offender and
those close to him, especially the likelihood and seriousness of financial
hardship and family disruption;
(2) The role that a plea and negotiated agreement may play in reha-
bilitating the offender;
(3) The value of a trial in fostering the community's sense of security
and confidence in law enforcement agencies; and
(4) The assistance rendered by the offender;
(a) in the apprehension or conviction of other offenders;
181 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, Pleas of Guilty Standard 1.8.
182 NAC: COURTS, supra note 49, Standard 3.3.
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(b) in the prevention of crimes by others;
(c) in the reduction of the impact of the offense on the vic-
tim; or
(d) in any other socially beneficial activity.18 3
In evaluating whether a particular plea agreement should be concluded,
the Pinciples of Federal Prosecution provide the prosecutor with four crite-
ria to guide his decision. These include whether the charge which the
defendant will plead bears a reasonable relationship to the nature and
extent of his criminal conduct, has an adequate factual basis, makes
likely the imposition of an appropriate sentence under all the circum-
stances of the case, and does not adversely affect the investigation or
prosecution of others. 184 The Princiles further caution the government
attorney to avoid "A/ford" pleas, i.e. guilty pleas entered by defendants
who nevertheless claim to be innocent, 8 5 stating that the attorney
should avoid such pleas except in the most unusual circumstances de-
spite their constitutional validity. 186
The guidelines put forth by the Justice Department, like the Ameri-
can Bar Association Standards,18 7 fail to raise the visibility of the plea
negotiation process and the administrative decisions made within it.188
To meet this deficiency, guidelines must recognize the factors underly-
ing decisions and set these factors out. The Justice Department guide-
lines fail to lay down such explicit standards. The Principles of Federal
Prosecution do not specify the alleged crimes in which charge reductions
or sentence concessions may follow in return for the defendant's assist-
ance, a necessary component of a comprehensive policy statement.1 89
The guidelines also fail to standardize the permissible reduced charges
or reduced sentence recommendations. 190 Local office policy, as expli-
183 Id
184 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at 27.
185 In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), the Supreme Court held that the
Constitution does not prohibit a court from accepting a guilty plea accompanied by a claim
of innocence from a defendant so long as the plea is entered voluntarily and intelligently and
thre is a strong factual basis for it.
186 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, s.upra note 9, at Part D(4) comment. The guidelines require the
approval of the responsible assistant attorney general for A/ord plea agreements. The Justice
Department cites the court in United States v. Bednarski, 445 F.2d 364, 366 (Ist Cir. 1971),
saying "the public might well not understand or accept the fact that a defendant who denied
his guilt was nonetheless placed in a position of pleading guilty and going to jail." However,
at least one court has concluded that it is an abuse of discretion to refuse to accept a guilty
plea solely because the defendant does not admit the alleged facts of the crime. United States
v. Gaskins, 485 F.2d 1046, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and the guidelines note that consequently,
apart from refusing to enter into a plea agreement, the degree to which the Department can
express its opposition to A/ford pleas may be limited. DEP'T OF JuSTIcE, supra note 9, at 31.
187 LaGoy, Senna & Siegel, supira note 150, at 463.
188 Id




cated in the guidelines, should designate those charges which will not be
reduced or negotiated under any circumstances. 191
Furthermore, the federal guidelines lack adequate sanctions and
quality control mechanisms to provide consistency in discretionary deci-
sion-making. For example, one controversial 92 proposal suggests the
need for additional procedures to ensure that disposition of negotiated
pleas is in fact the joint effort of prosecutor and judge. 193
Finally, if a prosecution is to be terminated pursuant to a plea
agreement, the Prinac'b/es of Federal Prosecution instruct prosecutors to see
that the case file contains a record of the agreed disposition, signed by
the defendant or his attorney. 194 Unlike Standard 1.7 of the American
Bar Association Standards for Plea Bargaining, 195 the guidelines do not
require a verbatim record of the proceedings on file where the defendant
enters such a plea.196 Nor do the guidelines require general disclosure of
the plea arrangements before acceptance of the plea. 197
With certain enumerated exceptions, the guidelines permit the gov-
ernment prosecutor to enter into a non-prosecution agreement in ex-
change for a person's cooperation when, in his judgment, the person's
timely cooperation appears to be necessary to the public interest and
other means of obtaining the desired cooperation are unavailable or
would be ineffective. 198 The guidelines list three considerations in deter-
mining whether the public interest requires a person's cooperation: the
importance of the investigation or prosecution to an effective program of
law enforcement, the value of the person's cooperation to the investiga-
tion or prosecution, and the person's relative culpability in connection
with the offense or offenses being investigated or prosecuted along with
his history with respect to criminal activity. 199
Although the latter two considerations appear to require greater
191 Id
192, Bubany & Skillern, supra note 2, at 502.
193 Id Additionally a complete file expounding upon all bases of consideration, should be
available to the court upon request. Id
194 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part D(4) comment. This is to facilitate compliance
with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires that a plea agree-
ment be disclosed in open court and that the disposition provided for in the agreement be
embodied in the judgment and sentence.
195 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, Pleas of Guilty Standard 1.7.
196 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9.
197 Cox lists a number of circuits which demand general disclosure of the plea arrange-
ments before accepting the plea, but notes that the disclosure is limited and the unfettered
discretionary powers of the prosecutor remain untouched. Cox, supra note 1, at 429 n.263.
198 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part F(l). The prosecutor must obtain approval
from the United States Attorney or a supervisory assistant United States Attorney. Id at Part
F(1) comment.
199 Id at Part F(2). The listed considerations, however, are not intended to be all-inclusive
or to require a particular decision in a particular case.
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prosecutorial individualization in decision-making, the first considera-
tion clearly requires more stringent direction by a state or local policy-
maker.200 The guidelines recognize that the primary function of a pros-
ecutor is to enforce the criminal law, and therefore the prosecutor
should not routinely or indiscriminately enter into agreements not to
enforce the law under particular conditions, but they fail to outline pre-
cisely what the conditions are.201
Again, the guidelines direct the prosecutor to place a memorandum
or other written record of the non-prosecution agreement in the case
file.20 2 While one of the purposes of this record is to facilitate identifica-
tion by government attorneys of persons whom the government has
agreed not to prosecute, 203 this does not eliminate disparity in decisions
unless all the attorneys in a particular jurisdiction inform themselves on
acceptable practices and general policy decisions.
PARTICIPATING IN SENTENCING
The prosecutor has discretion to make bail and sentence recom-
mendations to the judge, who may ignore the recommendations in
reaching the ultimate decision.20 4 According to the National District
Attorneys Association, the prosecutor's greatest impact on sentencing
lies in the area of plea negotiation. 20 5 Although the distinction between
plea or sentence negotiation and sentence recommendation after trial is
significant, the former may be viewed as a legitimate precedent to the
latter.20 6 The Association notes that plea negotiation carries benefits be-
yond mere expediency in that it allows some control over excessive or
inappropriate sentencing limitations, 20 7 such as narcotics laws.208 The
American Bar Association Standards also recognize the effect of plea
negotiation on sentencing and find that " 'it is generally appropriate for
200 See text accompanying note 108 supra.
201 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part F(2) comment. The Department merely notes
that the relative importance or unimportance of the contemplated case is a significant thresh-
old consideration. Id
202 Id at Part F(5). ' The memorandum or record should be signed or initialed by the
person with whom the agreement is made or his attorney, and a copy should be forwarded to
the Witness Record Unit of the Criminal Division." Id
203 Id at Part F(5) comment.
204 Cox, supra note 1, at 430.
205 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 290. These studies include pros-
ecutors at all levels of government. See also Teitelbaum, The Prosecutor 7 Role in the Sentencing
Process: A National Sur~vq, 1 Am. J. CRIM. L. 75 (1972).
206 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, sura note 6, at 290.
207 Id
208 Id The Association notes, for example, that a twenty year mandatory minimum sen-
tence for narcotic sales is uniformly considered too severe by judges and prosecutors, resulting
in a reduction of sales offenses to possession or use of narcotics.
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the prosecutor to make a recommendation ... where he has committed
himself to the defendant as a part of negotiations leading to a plea,'
because 'the existence and terms of an agreement are highly relevant to
the sentencing decision.' "209
The Princiles of Federal Prosecution, which, like the American Bar
Association Standards, generally discourage prosecutorial sentencing
recommendations, direct the prosecuting attorney to recommend the
sentence imposed when the terms of a plea agreement require him to do
so or when doing so is in the "public interest. ' 210 In considering the
public interest question, the guidelines instruct the prosecutor to bear in
mind the attitude of the court toward government sentencing recom-
mendations, and to weigh the desirability of maintaining a clear separa-
tion of judicial and prosecutorial responsibilities against the value of
prosecutorial input into the decision. 211 The National Advisory Com-
mission, on the other hand, states that in making sentence recommenda-
tions, a prosecutor should not consider whether a defendant entered a
plea of guilty to the charge or to a lesser offense than that initially
charged. 212 The Justice Department only tells the attorneys to be
"guided by the circumstances of the case and the wishes of the court
concerning the manner and form in which sentencing recommendations
are made."213 There is little concrete guidance as to when the public
interest warrants such an expression of what the government's view may
be, stating merely that it is a matter "to be determined with care, prefer-
ably after consultation between the prosecutor handling the case and his
supervisor." 214
The Justice Department warns the prosecutor that "by offering a
recommendation, he shares with the court the responsibility for avoiding
unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar back-
grounds who have been found guilty of similar conduct."215 Nowhere
do the guidelines outline such patterns, though; a ranking of
prosecutorial priorities for various crimes generally does not appear.
209 Id (citing ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 245).
2 10 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part G(3). The guidelines do require the prosecutor
to cooperate with the Probation Service in its preparation of the presentence investigation
report, review material in the presentence investigation report that is disclosed by the court to
the defendant or his attorney, and make a factual presentation to the court when: (i) sentence
is imposed without a presentence investigation and report; (ii) it is necessary to supplement or
correct the presentence investigation report; (iii) it is necessary in light of the defense presen-
tation to the court; or (iv) the court requests it, and be prepared to substantiate significant
factual allegations disputed by the defense. Id
211 Id at Part G(3) comment.
212 NAC: COURTS, supra note 49, Standard 3.8.
213 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part G(3) comment.
214 Id
215 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part G(4) comment.
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While it is essential to bear in mind that an overly rigid sentencing
structure, particularly one which attempts to set the sentence prior to
the commission of the crime, may go too far in meeting this problem,216
the individual factors necessary to a rational decision can still be ac-
counted for with a more specific and elaborate guideline. This is partic-
ularly true at the local level. Consideration of individual factors with no
standardization of the value of each characteristic ignores not only the
interests of equality under the law, but may also result in discrimination
against those defendants from the lowest socio-economic levels of soci-
ety.2 17 The Department of Justice's guidelines do not contain any crite-
ria for comparability of sentencing, nor do they provide guidance as to
what should be recommended. 218 For example, one commentator sug-
gests establishing two permutations of burglary, providing a one-year
sentence for simple burglary, and two years for aggravated burglary
(weapons, night, etc.). He further suggests adding a one-year increase
for each previous serious felony of which a defendant had been con-
victed and graduated reductions, based upon certain personal factors
such as age or mental condition, or pressure of circumstances. 219
The National District Attorneys Association contends that the pros-
ecutor's participation in sentence recommendation benefits both the
court and the public. The prosecutor reflects the victim's point of view,
thereby equalizing the defense counsels' recommendations, 220 and
bringing about more informed sentencing. However, the Association
concedes that "[t]hose who oppose the prosecutor's participation in sen-
tence recommendation are rightfully concerned with the potential
threat of distortion resulting from his adversary role and his invasion
216 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 6, at 339-40. An overly rigid framework leads to nullifica-
tion of the law in that prosecutors, judges, and juries will consequently ignore the law to
ensure a just result. The Model Sentencing Act explicitly rejects sentencing according to the
particular offense, for example. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, ADVI-
SORY COUNCIL OF JUDGES, MODEL SENTENCING ACT 2 (2d ed. 1972). See also Kaplan, supra
note 9, at 188.
217 Bayley, Good Intentions Gone Awg--A Proposalfor Fundamental Change in Criminal Sentening,
51 WASH. L. REV. 529, 537 (1976).
218 See generally D.E. AARONSON, supra note 122, at 117. One commentator hopelessly con-
cluded that it is "impossible to arrive at an objectively 'correct' and consistent system for
sentencing recommendations, charging that even the thirty-five specific criteria set forth in
the NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 6, provide little practical assistance in
assigning weights to all of the factors and their infinite numbers of combinations. Kava-
naugh, supira note 8, at 646.
219 Vorenberg, supra note 6, at 662-63. Although the example as given applies to judges,
the criteria are equally applicable to prosecution recommendations. So does the author's
warning that the "practical difficulties of making rules in advance for each of these situations
does not lead to the conclusion that judges should be given authority to weigh all the facts
and fix the punishment between the least and most serious variations." I at 662.
220 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, sup-a note 6, at 291.
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upon the judicial perogative. ' '22' A prosecutor should avoid pretending
greater power than he possesses to influence the disposition of a case,222
and the American Bar Association Standards additionally caution the
prosecutor that "the severity of the sentence is not necessarily an indica-
tion of the effectiveness or the efficiency of his office." 223
Although there is scant evidence that prosecutorial sentence recom-
mendation directly contributes to sentencing's major goal of rehabilita-
tion, 224 the Association justifies its Standard 18.1 on the prosecutor's role
in sentencing 225 as a reflection of "prosecutors' desires to continue to
exercise their discretionary power and to be able to participate as effec-
tively as possible in the criminal justice system, ' 226 adding that "[t]o
those who fear distortion or invasion or imbalance, there remains the
assurance of the judge's correlative discretion and the prosecutor's op-
tion to refrain from recommendation altogether. '227
According to one commentator, there is no simple way to restore
significance and accountability to the decisions of a prosecutor to either
make recommendations or promise not to say anything to the judge.2 28
However, she suggests that development of reasoned guidelines to pro-
vide consistency in similar factual situations might help to "bring...
rationality and accountability to such decision-making processes. '"229
The Justice Department guidelines, which direct the prosecutor to
weigh "all relevant considerations," including the seriousness of the de-
fendant's conduct, the defendant's background and personal circum-
stances, the purpose or purposes of sentencing applicable to the case and
the extent to which a particular sentence would serve such purpose or
purposes,230 do not go far enough to provide this necessary and desirable
consistency. The examples provided in the official comment to Rule
G(3) of the Principles of Federal Prosecution allow the prosecutor to proceed
with recommendations for leniency or harshness, with or without an in-
vitation or request by the court to do so.23 ' The two hypothetical exam-
ples, void of specific factual background, do not provide the "reasoned"
221 Id
222 See generaly id at Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures.
223 Id at Sentencing Alternatives & Procedures, Standard 5.3.
224 Id See also Teitelbaum, supra note 205, at 82-83.
225 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 6, at Standard 18.1. The standard
basically upholds the prosecution's option to make sentence recommendations.
226 Id at 292.
227 Id
228 Cox, supra note 1, at 431.
229 Id
230 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part G(4).
231 Id This is qualified by the statement that the primary responsibility for sentencing lies
with the judiciary, and government attorneys should therefore avoid routinely taking posi-
tions with respect to sentencing.
[Vol. 72
PROSECUTORIAL GUIDELINES
guidelines necessary for the evenhanded application of justice by local
prosecutors.
CONCLUSION
Local prosecutors undoubtedly have extensive opportunity to abuse
their far reaching discretion. Ultimately, of course, the individual integ-
rity of each prosecutor determines the quality of criminal justice as ap-
plied to American citizens. While it is hoped that the media, the public,
and administrative safeguards within each prosecutorial system monitor
deliberate deviations from standardized forms of procedure and accept-
able conduct, the achievement of this goal is unfortunately still debated.
It is less debatable that the inadvertant deviations, those which result
from inadequate direction and a lack of understanding as to what is
viewed as appropriate by other prosecutors within the system, permeate
local and state prosecutorial offices. The formulation and issuance of
detailed and comprehensive guidelines can correct unintentional dis-
crepancies in the treatment of defendants. As once commentator noted,
"[n]arrowing the scope of discretion so that it is no broader than the
ability to make intelligent individualized judgments would provide a
setting in which major improvements in criminal administration could
take place.' 23 2 While each community must develop policies and proce-
dures designed to meet the specific goals and needs of a unique locality
or state, a general model would avoid needless duplication of effort if
every community had to start from scratch. Unfortunately, the Pnczbles
of Federal Prosecution do not provide such a model and serve only as a
very limited starting point for the development of much needed state
and local guidelines.
While the guidelines proposed by the different professional organi-
zations, which were promulgated prior to the release of the federal
guidelines, contain many of the same deficiencies as the Princibles of Fed-
eral Prosecution, the Justice Department had a unique opportunity to
benefit from the hours of experience and discussion behind earlier pro-
posals, to overcome their deficiencies, and to issue an innovative and
comprehensive set of rules. The guidelines fail to meet this challenge
because they provide inadequate sanctions, overbroad generalizations
and non-specific hypotheticals. Authors of the rules may feel that the
supplementary direction provided to federal prosecutors compensate for
these deficiencies. Yet these additional resources are generally unpub-
licized and generally unavailable. While the title of the guidelines im-
plies that it only includes broad and sweeping principles of basic
prosecutorial considerations and is therefore technically not deceiving,
232 Vorenberg, supira note 6, at 652.
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the government bypassed an excellent opportunity to issue explicit con-
crete rules and priorities and thus quell criticisms of prosecutorial abuse
of discretion. Unfortunately, the guidelines alone do not further the
evenhanded administration of justice and thus are not useful. At most,
they merely advise the novice of basic criteria to take into account in
prosecuting crimes.
Many commentators attribute state and local prosecutors' reluc-
tance to develop internal guidelines to the fear that courts will require
prosecutors to actually adhere to the rules.2 33 The federal prosecutors
are no exception. The Principles of Federal Prosecution state, for example,
This statement of principles has been developed purely as a matter of in-
ternal Departmental policy and is being provided to federal prosecutors
solely for their own guidance in performing their duties. Neither this state-
ment of principles nor any internal procedures adopted by individual of-
fices pursuant hereto creates any rights or benefits. 234
It does not seem unreasonable, however, for administrators to want their
agencies to follow internally promulgated rules.2 35
The stated purpose of the Justice Department guidelines236 is met
only in part. Although the publication of the guidelines is commenda-
ble for formalizing previously unpublicized practices and policies, it
alone does not come close to ensuring fair and effective responsibility by
prosecuting attorneys. Too many gaps remain to foreclose disparate
treatment of similarly situated defendants, and these gaps should not be
duplicated by state, county, and city prosecutors formulating their own
guidelines. While the guidelines may promote confidence on the part of
the public and individual defendants that decisions will be made ration-
ally on the merits of each case, they provide no assurance of objectivity.
Safeguards and accountability are essential and must be added to en-
sure credibility and practicality at the state and local levels.
LESLIE DONAVAN
233 For example, in Billiteri v. United States Bd. of Parole, 400 F. Supp. 402 (W.D.N.Y.
1975), the court interpreted and forced the Board to adhere to the Parole Board Guidelines.
234 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 9, at Part A(5) comment.
235 Bayley, supra note 217, at 560 n.109.
236 See text accompanying note 42 supra.
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